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GREEK CONCEPTIONS OF NAMING:
THREE FORMS OF APPROPRIATENESS IN
PLATO AND THE LITERARY TRADITION
SUSAN B. LEVIN

IT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED that Plato's critical engagement with the
literary tradition plays a central role in his treatment of ethical questions in the Republic, and his handling of that tradition there has been
a major topic of inquiry in Platonic scholarship. What has not been explored, however, is the full nature and extent of Plato's reliance on literary

antecedents in other important areas of his thought, especially in his discussions of naming. Judgments of whether 6voiata are properly assigned to
their referents figure prominently in Greek literature. Of particular note is
their employment in connection with etymology, eponymy, and functional
terms like "mother" and "son."1 An investigation of the Cratylus, Phaedo,
and Republic reveals that in his treatment of appropriateness in these dialogues Plato operates against the backdrop of literary practice in each of
these three respects.

This article combines reflection on the pertinent literary sources with dis-

cussion of Plato's reaction to them.2 The investigation will show that while
Plato rejects outright the philosophical value of etymology, his own theories of appropriateness with respect to eponymy and functional terms consist to a notable degree of revamped, systematized versions of literary
approaches. This inquiry provides support for the view that Plato's occupation with literary sources is more extensive than heretofore acknowledged.
Moreover, it underscores the fact that Plato's approach to the literary tradition parallels in at least one crucial way his treatment of other philosophers:

1. Both etymology and eponymy involve deriving an 6vopa from one or more source-6v6paita. Names
subject to etymological analysis often provide criteria by which bearers are assessed, and in such cases

v6paita are correctly assigned if their semantic constitution accurately describes their referents' na
Eponymy differs from etymology, e.g., in its relative de-emphasis on questions of "nature transfer" and in
the fact that its associated judgments of fitness do not invoke words' semantic constitution. Finally, I have

chosen the phrase "functional terms" to encompass &v6paTa used with reference to individuals by virtue o
particular familial or sociopolitical roles they play. All citations are from the OCT editions (for Plato I have
used Burnet's Oxford edition).
2. I treat the Cratylus and Phaedo at length in Levin 1995 and forthcoming, respectively. I draw selec-

tively on those discussions in Sections I-II of the present article, which seeks to emphasize the full impact of
literary sources on Plato's theorizing about naming in the middle dialogues and the relationships between his
multiple uses of them.

Classical Philology 92 (1997): 46-57
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GREEK CONCEPTIONS OF NAMING 47

just as Plato does not hesitate to articulate revised versions of ideas presented by philosophers with whom he is at odds in key respects, so too his
critical stance toward literary sources does not prevent him from adapting
to his own purposes potentially fruitful reflections contained therein.
I. ETYMOLOGY: LITERARY PRACTICE AND THE CRATYLUS

The Cratylus focuses above all on the thesis that 6vo6pata are assigned
correctly if etymological analyses of them disclose their referents' natures.
While sophists and philosophers often serve as a backdrop for Plato's re-

flections, the evidence is not sufficient to explain the etymological section
of the dialogue. I maintain that this portion of the Cratylus takes the literary
tradition as a central opponent.3

Early on Plato rejects, through Hermogenes, the idea that sophistic inquiries pertain directly to the investigation of naming that will be undertaken in the dialogue (391C-D). Hermogenes' negative reaction to the
sophists leads Socrates to observe that he must learn instead from Homer
and the other poets (391C8-D1). One might be tempted to discount this
remark because of Plato's hostility elsewhere toward the literary tradition.4
Far from rejecting literary sources, however, Hermogenes wishes to familiarize himself with Homer's approach to the topic at hand. Plato's treatment

of "the correctness of words or names" (6vop%taiv opOo6t) begins with

Socrates' turn to the literary tradition.

Plato uses the names of Hector and his son to explain what he means

here by 6pO`tq. Socrates underscores the closeness in semantic constitution of the names "Astyanax" and "Hector" (cJXF60v -V tcTaUTOv cTriativFt,
factktKa ktTpoTCpa ivcat it\a 6vo6jiaTa, 393A6-7), and ties the latter to the
verb'FcXtv (cf. II. 24.729-30). Both names are viewed as properly assigned,
and Plato concludes that Homer's view of correctness has been illuminated
(393B3-4). His privileging of the name "Astyanax" constitutes a revision
of the Iliad, where the fact that Hector employs "Scamandrius" (6.402-3)
lends primacy to that appellation. Plato prefers "Astyanax" because it is
easily investigated by etymology and accommodates itself to the ties in
semantic constitution that he wishes to forge with "Hector." The presence
of this revision shows that, far from simply repeating his literary sources,
Plato is adapting them to his own philosophical ends.
After giving examples of Homer's treatment of 6voiara, Plato etymologizes the names of members of the House of Atreus: Orestes (394E), Agamemnon (395A-B), Atreus (395B-C), Pelops (395C-D), and Tantalus
(395D-E). Since it is in tragedy, not the Iliad, that the affairs of the royal
House itself take center stage, these etymologies expand the scope of Socrates' turn to the literary tradition. It is worth noting, in addition, that the
3. The present survey of etymology and eponymy focuses on Homer's Iliad and Odyssey; Hesiod's
Theogonia and Opera et Dies; Pindar's epinician odes; the extant plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripi-

des; and Herodotus.

4. For interpretations along these lines, see Weingartner 1970, 23 and 1973, 38; Meridier 1931, 15-16;

and Friedlander 1964, 204.
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ensuing discussion contains numerous references to Homer, Hesiod, and
tragedy.5

Writers in the literary tradition frequently articulate the descriptive content of 6v6ptaa, largely proper names, by way of etymology. Particularly
striking is the tremendous range of criteria on the basis of which 6vo6ptaTa are
said to be assigned.6 First, appellations might be derived from something

important pertaining to an individual's birth and early life. This category
may be subdivided, in turn, into assignments traced to the manner or direct
cause of an individual's genesis, an object with which the named individual
is associated at birth, the place of an individual's birth, an event prior to
birth, and an event that takes place soon after birth.7 Second, assignments
might be correlated with features or aspects of individuals or groups. Names
may be tied to a physical feature or related aspect of an individual (or
common to a group of individuals), an individual's emotional state, bearers'
attitudes and character traits, or individuals' skills and capacities.8 A third
category comprises instances in which 6vvo6ptaia are connected with actions.
The relevant subdivisions are a type of activity by which an individual or
group is distinguished; an individual's or group's temporal relation to a particular course of action, or to other individuals engaged in a certain course

of action; and the role a place or individual has in someone else's plan of
action.9 Fourth, analyses may emphasize the role an individual plays in a

5. Regarding Homer one may consult, e.g., 402A6, B4, 408A4, 410C2, and 417C8. Hesiod's name occurs, e.g., at 396C4, 397E5, and 406C7. Concerning tragedy, see, e.g., 408C-D and 425D5. For further discussion of Plato's framing of the Cratylus' inquiry, and of the dialogue's sources, see Levin 1995.
6. No one set of categories could do justice to the complexity of literary etymology and eponymy; the
categories used here simply facilitate the organization of this material for present purposes. In the case of
passages that might reasonably be categorized in multiple ways, I make what seems on balance to be the best
choice.

7. With respect to the origin of individuals, see Hes. Th. 195-98, Aesch. Cho. 948-51 (see also Aesch.
Sept. 662-63 and Hes. Op. 256), Aesch. Supp. 250-51 (cf. X0O6va in 253), Aesch. PV 850-51, and Supp. 40-4
(along with Supp. 313, 315, and 535), and Soph. OC 1320-22. For an object as the source of an assignment
see Hes. Th. 280-83. The place of an individual's birth grounds v6paita at Hes. Th. 199 and Th. 280-83
(11. 280-83, cited both here and in the previous subcategory, involve Xpuadwp on the former occasion an

I-iiyaaoo on the latter). For events prior to birth as the source of assignments, see Pind. Isthm. 6.53 and Hdt.

6.63.3. Lastly, v6paita are traced to events soon after birth at Pind. 01. 6.53-57, 01. 6.45-47, Soph. O
1032-36 and 717-19 (along with 1349-50, Eur. Phoen. 25-27 and 801-5, cf. 41-42), and Hdt. 5.921.
8. With respect to the first subcategory, see Hom. Od. 12.85-87, Hes. Th. 144-45, Aesch. Sept. 532-37
and Eur. Supp. 888-89, Hdt. 1. 139, cf. Pind. Pyth. 5.57-59 (with 4.63). Individuals' emotional states groun

assignments at Soph. Aj. 430-32 and Eur. Bacch. 508. Bearers' attitudes and character traits are emphasize

at Hom. II. 2.212-64, Od. 4.499-503, Od. 20.288-90, Hes. Th. 233-36, Soph. Phil. 1344-47 (with 141333), Eur. Tro. 989-90, Bacch. 1197-99, IA 1402 (with 1410-11, 1422-23, 1595, cf. 1375-76), and Rhes
215 (cf. 216-18). Finally, individuals' skills and capacities ground assignments at Hom. 11. 11.450, Eur.
Hipp. 1218-20, Eur. Supp. 881-87, Hel. 8-14, Hom. Od. 8.43-45, Eur. IT 32-33, Hes. Th. 510-11 (combined with the illustration in 535-52, see also Hes. Op. 54 and Aesch. PV 85-87), Hes. Op. 83-89 and Pind

Pyth. 5.27-29 (cf. Hes. Th. 511), and Hom. Od. 13.330-32.

9. Types of activity give rise to v6pa-ta at Aesch. Ag. 1080-82 (cf. 1085-86, see also Eur. Or. 121 and

955-56), Hom. Od. 11.422-30 (see also 24.199 and Aesch. Ag. 1100-1103), Aesch. Ag. 681-92 (cf. Eur.
Andr. 105-6), Aesch. Sept. 577-79 (with 658, 829-31, Eur. Phoen. 636-37 and 1493), Hes. Op. 80-82,
Soph. Phil. 1229-30, Aesch. Pers. 176-78 (reinforced by 171), and Hes. Th. 207-10. Temporal relations
are emphasized at Hom. Od. 11.506-18 and Soph. Phil. 245-47 (see also 70-73 and 348-51), and Eur.
Supp. 1224-25. The focus is on the role the recipient plays in a plan of action at Eur. Hel. 1670-75 and Hdt.
7.193.2. In the latter case, the source of the assignment is unspecified (Herodotus says simply that Tcj x6ppq
oi6vopa y?yove A9pTat); nevertheless, the place comes to have this 6vopa based on the role it played as a

launching point for the Argonauts in the context of their mission.
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particular social or familial context. 10 In addition, 6v
tions and special powers of the divine.'1 The focus h
ment over which an individual has control, special capacities of individual
deities, or the instrumental role an individual or group plays in the universe

as a whole.12
This extensive body of literary etymologies, combined with textual cues
provided by Plato himself in framing the inquiry into 6pO6tS, constitutes
a major backdrop for the Cratylus. As I argued in Levin 1995, 98-99, the fact
that numerous 6vW6ata analyzed by Plato were also etymologized in literary sources provides further evidence of the dialogue's link to that tradition. For the purposes of illustration, one may cite the following cases:
"Hector" and "Astyanax" (392D-393B, cf. 394B6-Cl);13 "Zeus" (395E-

396B);14 "Cronus" (396B);15 Ocof (397C-D);16 "Hades" (403A and 404B);17
"Demeter" (404B);18 "Hera" (404B-C);19 "Apollo" (405B-406A);20 "Aph-

rodite" (406C-D);21 "Athena" (407A-C);22 and "Ares" (407D).23
At the core of literary practice is a belief in the existence of individual na-

tures and the idea that etymological analyses illuminate those (puikYU.24 In
direct opposition to the literary tradition's assumption that names are naturerevealing-and to that extent correct-Plato concludes that convention
10. On the names "Hector" and "Astyanax," see Hom. II. 24.729-30, 22.506-7, 6.402-3, 24.499-501,
Eur. Tro. 590, 1168, and 1217; for other examples, see Hdt. 4.161.2, Soph. OC 1367-69 (combined with
1192 and 1323-26), and Hdt. 4.155.2-3.

11. In general this category is reserved for functions and powers that mortals do not have, and passages

that depict gods as having capacities that also belong to mortals, or doing things that mortals too can do, are
placed in other categories.

12. Regarding the first subcategory, one may consult Hom. I. 5.775-76 (see also 14.277-88, cf. Eur.
Hel. 31-36 and 241-51). Capacities of individual deities are emphasized at Hom. II. 5.844-45, Soph. OT
919-21 and Eur. Alc. 220-25, Aesch. Sept. 944-46, and PV 910-12. Finally, analyses of the two forms of
Zeus' name underscore the referent's instrumental role in the cosmos (see Hes. Op. 1-4, Aesch. Ag. 1485-87,
Pind. Isthm. 3.4-5, Aesch. Supp. 584-85, and Eur. Or. 1635). Other examples are found at Eur. Bacch. 27576 (see also Phoen. 683-86) and Hdt. 2.52.1.

For analyses of 6v6pata based on significant effects that their referents have on mortals, see Aesch.
Pers. 205-6 and Hom. Od. 19.562-67. Elsewhere names are tied to entities (animate or inanimate) with

which an individual or group is associated. These might be entities used in the performance of actions (Hom.

II. 7.138-41, Od. 2.93-110 [see also 19.137-56 and 24.128-48], Eur. Hipp. 307-10 [see also 582-83,
1131-34, cf. 1166]); or an article of clothing that an individual or group is said to wear (Hom. Od. 5.228-32,
Hdt. 4.107). Finally, a characteristic of the place from which an individual hails may ground an assignment

(Hom. Od. 1. 180-81), and the 6vopa of a natural, inanimate entity might be traced to an important individual
with whom it is linked (Aesch. PV 732-34).
13. For literary references see n. 10.

14. For relevant literary observations see n. 12.
15. See Aesch. PV910-12.
16. See Hdt. 2.52.1.

17. See Hom. II. 5.844-45.
18. Here one may consult Eur. Bacch. 275-76 and Phoen. 683-86.

19. See Hom. II. 5.775-76 and 14.277-88 (cf. Eur. Hel. 31-36 and 241-51).
20. Pertinent literary reflections include Aesch.Ag. 1080-82, Eur. Or. 121, 955-56, and Soph. OT919-21.
21. See Hes. Th. 195-98 and Eur. Tro. 989-90. Plato registers his preference for Hesiod's analysis.
22. See Hom. Od. 13.330-32. Notably, Plato begins by mentioning Homer's interpreters.
23. See Aesch. Sept. 944-46.

24. The literary tradition does not have a technical philosophical notion of individual natures, according
to which one seeks and employs a rigid set of necessary and sufficient conditions for making identifications.
Instead, authors operate with a loose, non-technical notion according to which a particular individual, either
mortal or divine, is widely recognized by a salient characteristic or power. Thus construed, individual natures
play a central role in the Cratylus.
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explains the fitness of terms' constitution.25 He insists, however, that terms'
application will be misguided if one does not determine which entities are
naturally basic. Only entities that are both unchanging and unchangeable
satisfy that description (439C7-440D3).
By the end of the Cratylus it is clear that etymologies cannot aid one
reliably in the apprehension of Platonic natures, that is, Forms. While some
analyses may be suggestive, many others will lead one astray by fostering
misconceptions and disagreements about reality itself. It is surely no acci-

dent that Plato uses his treatment of the term &KaROV (412C-413D), whose
referent plays a crucial role in his ontology, as a vehicle for suggesting that

analyses of terms' descriptive content cannot resolve disputes about (pUcsciS.
Plato returns to this issue in the final section of the dialogue (438-440),
where he states explicitly that what is required is movement in the opposite

direction, namely, from natures to 6voit-ata.
In addition to sketching his conception of reality, Plato hints at his own
approach to the issue of correctness. Taking beauty as an example, he first
urges us to seek access to changeless Forms (439D3-6), then diagnoses a

fundamental shortcoming in individual sensibles (439D8-1 1):
Can we appropriately call something "beauty" if that thing is always withdrawing ... or
is it not in fact necessary that at the very same moment we speak of it, it straightaway

changes into something else and withdraws, and in no way remains in the same state?

TAp' oiUv otov TE 7tpOc?1ucv a5TO 6pp0M, Ei &i 6nE4?pXETat ... fi &v6yKI a&a fOv
XF76VT(OV &kko aTr6 E60bg yi7VEcoOat Kai 67EE4t?Vat Kai p&K?Tt oiT5Oq ?X%1V;

Plato suggests that individual sensibles' ontological deficiency precludes
their being properly (i.e., unqualifiedly) spoken of as "beautiful." His statement at 439D8-1 1, interpreted against the backdrop of D3-6, implies that
one cannot make judgments of fitness of the same type about Forms and
particulars. These final comments move in the direction of an alternative

theory of appropriateness insofar as they point both to the existence of a
hierarchy in the application of certain 6vo6ptaTa and to the important role of
ontological considerations in any given judgment of correctness. Although
what Plato says here could serve as the germ of, or point of departure for,
a positive account of fitness, it is itself a far cry from the presentation of

such a theory. One must consult the Phaedo for a more elaborate description of Plato's metaphysical stance and the specification of its associated
linguistic commitments.26

II. POURING NEW WINE INTO OLD SKINS: EPONYMY
IN LITERATURE AND IN THE PHAEDO

In the Phaedo, Plato presents his own theory of the basis on which vvopx
are assigned correctly to their referents. As has long been recognized, this
theory centers on the eponymy or "named-after" relation. Thus, at a crucial
point in the dialogue Plato notes that Forms exist and that "the other things,
25. For a defense of the view that the Cratylus endorses convention, see Schofield 1982.

26. Additional discussion of the Cratylus' outcome is provided in Levin 1995, 107-11.
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participating in them, are named after the Forms themselves" (-cov5-cv takka

IicTaXciivovta avT(v ToUTOWv -cilv ?MOvulIiav tcXFtv, 102B1-2). Subse-

quently, he articulates a general and fundamental contrast between things

that have opposites, which are named after those opposites (F,ovo6aiovtc:
acTa T5 F' KFtVC V sxvupii,a), and "those opposites themselves from whose
inherence in them the things named receive their appellations ('F,Xt -civ
F=ovupitav)" (103B6-8).
While Heraclitus and Parmenides are Plato's precursors in key respects,
and despite the fact that they evince an interest in issues of naming, neither
frames his linguistic concerns in the way Plato does or invokes eponymy
as a solution to those problems he does identify. Literary eponymy constitutes a previously unexplored antecedent of Platonic usage. In what follows
I comment on literary practice and the Phaedo's new, technical construction

of eponymy.27
Literary instances of eponymy fall into multiple categories. The first consists of instances in which individuals give their 0voptaa to other individuals, groups of individuals, places or parcels of land, natural inanimate
entities (e.g., bodies of water), and human constructions or practices.28 Second, natural inanimate entities are the eponyms of individuals, peoples,
other natural inanimate entities, and places or bodies of land.29 Third, places
or parcels of land give their 6vvo6piata to a range of entities, among them
places, animals, and natural inanimate entities.30 Fourth, a parcel of land

may receive its name from a people.31 Finally, writers offer a range of judg
ments of appropriateness.32
The centerpiece of Platonic metaphysics in the middle dialogues is a

dichotomy between reality and appearance and an account of their connec-

tion. Forms, qua Tpuctci or o5iatca, are the constituents of reality proper an
hence the primary entities in Plato's framework. In contrast, the relevant
classes of entities in the spatiotemporal realm derive their natures from

Forms due to a relation to ct6r1 that is identified as "participation." These
entities may be designated as "secondary" due to this fundamental dependence on Forms, and to the fact that they share those natures only partially.
Terms such as Kakov and a'ya0O6v have, therefore, a twofold application, insofar as they may be used in locutions referring either to Forms or to their
participants. The application is "primary" in the case of Forms, due to their
status as primary entities, and "secondary" in that of participants, since
those entities' natures are both derivative and incomplete.

While the fact that the framework of eponymy accommodates primary
and secondary referents makes it potentially valuable to Plato, its employ-

ment for philosophical purposes necessitates the modification of literary
practice. In literary usage, the identity of primary and secondary entities
27. For extensive consideration of literary and Platonic eponymy, see Levin, forthcoming.

28. Examples are found at Pind. Isthm. 7.24, Hom. II. 20.230, Eur. El. 1275, Aesch. PV 839-41, and
Soph. El. 282-85.

29. See Hom. II. 4.474-77, Hdt. 4.184.3-4, 1.145, and Pind. Pyth. 1.30-32, respectively.
30. For examples see Eur. Hel. 149-50, Hdt. 7.40.3, and 7.12 1.1.
31. See Hdt. 4.204.

32. For examples one may consult Aesch. Supp. 250-53 and Hom. Od. 18.5-7.
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varies extensively, and it is possible for the eponym and recipient to be
singular or plural. Moreover, there are no fixed criteria determining which
types of entities can play each role, and which kinds may serve as relata.
The same type of entity (e.g., a group of individuals) may even function in
both primary and recipient capacities.
Plato establishes firm criteria governing the identity of entities in the
two roles. They must be on different planes of existence, and the distinction
he articulates in entities' ontological status precludes that interchangeability
of roles noted in literary eponymy. In addition, while the eponym must invariably be singular, its nominata constitute a plurality either in reality or

by potential. Moreover, Plato's stipulation of the ways in which the primary
entity or Form is prior generates criteria for the correct application of its
ovota to a class of recipients. Plato's approach is most similar to those instances of literary usage in which individuals give their names to groups.
From his perspective, however, even this type of case exhibits fundamental

shortcomings. First, the eponym's location in or connection to the spatio-

temporal world bars it from having that priority over the derivative 6vopabearer that must always support the "named-after" relation. In addition, the

secondary entities here do not exhaust the scope of possible nominata in
Plato's scheme, but instead constitute only a subset thereof.

The foregoing discussion makes clear that although Plato rejects decisively literary antecedents that he views as philosophically unpromising, he
does not hesitate to embrace notions that do have potential. As we have
seen, in his philosophy of language Plato in fact does both. In the Cratylus,
he criticizes the literary tradition's use of etymology. Moreover, Plato's disbelief in the philosophical value of an attempt at its reconstruction is evident both in the fundamental nature of his challenge to literary practice
and in the fact that what hints he does provide at the close of the dialogue
of the form his own theory will assume point in quite a different direction. The Cratylus' engagement with the literary tradition thus terminates
in Plato's rejection of one manifestation of its handling of fitness. In the
Phaedo, in contrast, where Plato seeks a framework in which to express his

own insights about Np0O6ri, he concludes that a modified version of a sec-

ond key literary device, namely, eponymy, is best suited to capture the semantics of the Form-participant relation. In what follows I turn to Republic
5, where, for a third time, Plato treats the issue of appropriateness against a
literary backdrop. In this case, as we will see, Plato's theory of the proper
allocation of sociopolitical and familial roles leads him to assign an important philosophical position to a revamped construction of yet another
device prominent in literature.
III. FUNCTIONAL TERMS: PLATO's REVISION OF LITERARY
USAGE IN LIGHT OF HIS CONCEPTION OF THE IDEAL 7nO?t1

When Plato turns in Republic 5 to the procreation and rearing of children
(461D2-E2), he makes the assertion that
a man will call all children born in the tenth or seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons (if they are male) or daughters (if they are female), and all of them will
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call him father. He will call their children his grandchildren, and they, in turn, will call
the members of the group to which he belongs grandfathers and grandmothers. Moreover, they will call those offspring born at the time when their mothers and fathers were
producing children their sisters and brothers. The result will be that of which we spoke,
namely, that the relevant groups avoid sexual relations with one another.

acp fl aLv fkpac T1i auTwV vujtpioi YEVfl-ct, j cT ?K?iViV &KaT) ijVI Ki kf360tpq 6i
av Y?VflTtal ?K70Va, T'aUTLa na7aVT(La 7po?Ycp?1 -ca j?V cpp?va Ui, Ta & Okca ouywacpac, Kail
?K?1Va ?K?1VOV 7naCTpa, KCl 0T() 6f T& COUCWV ?K7VCa nai6&v nCLL6aC, Kai ?K?1V aLU

?KciVoU5 nda7titoUS T? Kai TcLodai, Ta 6 ?v ?KciVq TX xpovcp Eyov06-a, ?V (p ati JiflThpFc KaL

oi E(aT?pc5 a?Yco)V 7?VVwoV, a6cka(pa T? Kai a6ck.po06, 6scr, O VUV6i ?Wyotcv, adjXwv

The following discussion of Plato's view of the family sets it against the
backdrop of literary reflections for the purpose of illustrating both where he
aligns himself with them and where the realization of his philosophical purposes necessitates his breaking new ground. Here, in contrast to the discussions of etymology and eponymy, I focus exclusively on tragedy.33
Plato, like the poets, distinguishes sharply between the descriptive and
prescriptive levels in the application of functional terms. He takes quite
seriously the prescriptive or normative use of these terms in tragedy, and incorporates the idea, emphasized repeatedly there, that biological connections
are not ultimately decisive when the goal is to determine who may properly
be said to be mutually "related" as, for example, mother and daughter.34 Most
specifically, he accepts the idea that biological ties are neither a sufficient
nor even a necessary condition for the ascription of kinship ties in the case

of those guardians and their progeny who will populate the ideal state.35 Plato
is not content merely to specify that children born to guardians will be taken
over by officials chosen for this task (460B7-8) since this arrangement is
compatible, at least in principle, with parents' still having some relationship
with progeny they know to be their own. Plato insists that this recognition
itself must not occur, prescribing that "no parent will know his own

offspring, nor will any child know its parent" (91T? yov?a ?K7OVOV ci6&vat I

a Tob 915TE naI6a yovEa, 457D2-3). He adds that when a mother who

nursing is brought to the creche in which her infant has been placed, the
presiding officials "will go to great lengths to ensure that mothers do not

learn who their children are" (nduav WnXaviv puxaav&jicvot 67TU0 g1j6Egiia tO
33. In so doing, I of course do not claim that it constitutes the only relevant precedent, but simply that it
is a pertinent and important antecedent in the present context. For discussions of this difficult section of Re-

public 5, see, e.g., Adam 1902, 292-315; Grube 1927; Comford 1941, 155-68; Rankin 1965; Bloom 1968,
384-88; and Halliwell 1993, 155-82. For consideration of changes in Plato's recommendations conceming
marriage between the Republic and Laws, see Fortenbaugh 1975.

34. Here one may cite a common thread, i.e., a marked de-emphasis on biology, running through Plato's
treatment both of the family and of women's nature and possible role in the ideal r6oktq.
35. In the literary tradition, where words like "mother" and "son" often have normative force, the exis-

tence of biological connections is not sufficient or even required for terms' proper employment; one considers instead whether an individual performs the duties implied by the term in question. Clytemnestra's

progeny, for example, question the appropriateness of calling her "mother" (see Aesch. Cho. 189-91,
Soph. El. 271-74, 595-98, 1145-56 [esp. 1154], 1194; cf. Eur. Or. 557-59 and 585-86); this concern
about appropriateness is also raised with respect to Deianira (see Soph. Trach. 817-18 and 1064-67).
These remarks indicate that being someone's mother in the biological sense is not sufficient to generate an
entitlement to be addressed by the appellation in question; rather, one's character and actions provide the
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au6ciG aOi(y0f at, 460C9-D1). As Plato stresses at 461D-E, kinship distinctions in his ideal state are to be based, not on biological ties, but instead

on those conventions established by its founders.36
Moreover, like the tragedians, Plato distinguishes explicitly between being someone's kin in name only, and performing the actions characteristic
of one with a given role (463C9-D6):
As legislator, will you stipulate merely that they use the relevant kinship terms, or will
you insist that they also do all the things that are implied by those terms? For example,
must they show to those designated as their fathers the same respect, solicitude, and
obedience currently due to parents? Won't they be held in low esteem by gods and men
if they do anything less, since they will have acted against the dictates of piety and
justice?

710rTpov aUT5oli ct&6vta-a jt6vov OiKdav% VoftOvccit, fl Kai Ta& npad1ic nduaG KaWa Ta
6Ovta-ra rpdTct?v, iupi T? TO6& naT?pai, ovya v6jtoi pi pEaT?pac ai6oub T? n?pt KalX Kf6ltOVicv Kait TOU U6nKOOV 6&1V ?1Val TWV yOV?WV, fl jfTh 6pOS O&@v jnT? ip6O dvOptv
aU-(ip &?ltVOV ?cy?coai, Xi 0UT? Oyta 0OT? 6iKala npaTTovcoi av, ?i akka rpaTToi r Tabua;37

Following the tragic poets, Plato assumes that it is possible-and in crucial

instances desirable-for people who lack biological connections to one
another nevertheless to establish and sustain a whole series of kinship relations (463C-E).8
Even as Plato builds in crucial ways on literary practice, he also diverges
from it in key respects. Above all one may cite the metaphysical foundation

definitive criterion in light of which judgments of fitness are made. For similar remarks involving the term
"daughter," see Eur. Tro. 766-71; with regard to "son," see Soph. OC 1323-24 and 1367-69, cf. Soph.
Trach. 1199-1205. Admetus reproaches both his parents at once for their failure to offer themselves up to
die in his place. Since Alcestis makes the sacrifice that Admetus believes to be their responsibility, he
concludes that it is she-rather than they-to whom the appellation "parent" is appropriate. For relevant
passages, see Eur. Alc. 636-49 and 658-68; the fact of his parents' advanced age is clearly pertinent (see
634-35, 648-50, and 669-72). Admetus' expressed doubts about his parentage do not appear to reflect
genuine concerns on the biological plane; rather, his substantive complaints all involve his parents' failure
to meet what he views as their obligations toward him as their son. For discussion of this issue, see
Griffith 1978. This case is noteworthy for its introduction of the idea that one who has a non-biological
kinship relation to the speaker may nevertheless be entitled to an appellation denoting biological ties
based on considerations of attitude and behavior.

Finally, one may cite the relation between Ion and the priestess at Delphi (see Eur. Ion 49-51, 132425, and 1363). The participle in 1. 1324 has clear concessive force (ou TE06oia iEp); hence, the import of
Ion's remark is that although the priestess is not his biological parent, she deserves to be greeted as
"'mother" based on her treatment of him. In 1. 1363, in turn, 6?q combines with vTov to suggest that in the

priestess' view their relationship does not loosely approximate that of mother and son while necessarily
falling short, but that in all essentials the relationship has achieved that status. While both readily acknowledge the absence of a biological tie, their remarks show that the priestess' attitude and conduct
generate a justification for her being called by the appellation of "mother." This case shows that, far from
being sufficient to ground judgments of fitness involving functional terms, neither biological nor other
kinship ties between "relatives" are even required.

36. Cf. Bloom 1968, 385 for an emphasis on the conventional foundation of the family.
37. In terms of literary precedents, Electra, for example, insists that Clytemnestra PuTip caXEITat- PflTpt

6' o6&v Eitoit (Soph. El. 1194); here the discrepancy between appellation and conduct or attitude is quite
explicitly formulated. In remarks calling to mind those of Electra, but focusing on Deianira, Hyllus exclaims:

6yKov ... &Xkoa 6v6OpaTOt Tti TpE TpV ipqTp6oV, jTtm Pf&V Xq TEKo6Ia 8pa; (Soph. Trach. 817-18).
38. Plato and the poets differ, however, in their views about the composition of the two groups, and in
their reasons for making assignments to them. For Plato the crucial distinction is between guardians and
producers, since he does not include the latter in Republic S's proposal.
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of his discussion, which ultimately governs all of the Republic's proposed
innovations. Most briefly put, the connections are as follows: The ground of

everything is Plato's conviction that Forms constitute natures ((pu6t?)
proper. Using his view of reality as a foundation, Plato divides human na-

ture into types, evaluating each based on its capacity to apprehend these
natures. Those individuals judged most favorably are in the best position,
due to their understanding, to inject order into the realm of Forms' participants. If they are to be motivated and prepared for this undertaking, through
their upbringing and education it must become "second nature" to them to
view the state as though it were a single, living organism whose "health"
(i.e., order and unity) is in fact their paramount concern. This can happen
only if they are not distracted by private concerns, whether these be emotional attachments or worries about the accumulation and loss of wealth.

As Plato argues in Republic 5 prior to his discussion of kinship ties, both
women and men can serve as philosopher-rulers, and, more generally, as

guardians. In his view, members of both sexes are best able to perform their
social functions if marriage and procreation are regulated so as to promote
a social and political unity that is far more than the mere sum of its parts.39
Hence, having started with the theory of Forms, one arrives eventually at
those prescriptions formulated at Republic 46ID-E.
In addition, while one may extract generalizations concerning poets' views
from their remarks about functional terms and their referents, these generalizations are not offered by poets themselves, who remain content to analyze
the phenomena on a case-by-case basis. Plato's metaphysical framework not
only lends his inquiry a systematic character absent from poets' reflections,
but also constitutes the backdrop and justification for all of his proposals.
Furthermore, in contrast to tragedy, which concentrates on kinship relations,
Plato's theory emphasizes a close connection between the treatment of social
roles-most notably ruling-and matters of kinship; hence, his assessments
of fitness occur with respect to both sets of functional terms.
It is worth noting, finally, that there may be a connection between Plato's
treatments of eponymy and functional terms insofar as those properly
called "rulers" are viewed as such due to their awareness that a key range
of terms have primary and secondary referents. In Republic 5, Plato lays
great weight on the distinction between philosopher-rulers and those so-

called "lovers of wisdom" (actually yptk?6obot, 480A) who are merely

amored of appearances (476A9-B2; cf. 480A):

I distinguish accordingly those about whom you were just now speaking, the lovers of

spectacles, lovers of crafts, and men of action, from those who are the actual focus of our
argument and who alone merit the appellation "philosophers."

T ,T&r -oivuv ... 6taipd, Xwpii j?v O5 VUV66 ?kcyi IptkOocatova T? Kai pkOT?xVOUi Kai
7npaKcTKOUS, Kai x(lpig au 71?pi (DV 0 k6yo, OUS jt6vouU av Tit 6pOC5@ ipoc?ioto Ipkocv6pou.

39. For Plato's emphasis on the close relation between the first and second "waves" discussed in Repub
lic 5, see 457C-D. The community of wives and children among the guardians is identified as a crucial caus

of unity in the r6oktq (464A).
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At a critical point in his elucidation of this distinction (476C9-D3), Plato
identifies the philosopher as
the one who believes that there is something beautiful in itself and can discern both it
and the things that participate in it, never mistaking its participants for it or it for its
participants.

O ... fyo6Up?v6O T? T?l a6TO KakOV Kai 6uv6ijtvoi KacOopcv Kai LUTO Kai ca ?K?1VOU jmTVXOVTa, Kai OUT? -ca ?Th?XoVTa ar?UTO OUT? a616O ca jmTvXovTa fyOU?tEVOi.

To solidify this division between philosophers and all others, Plato articulates a systematic distinction between faculties and their proper objects,

emphasizing that, unlike Forms themselves, participants in Forms-that is,
the objects of opinion-are both F and not-F because they always partake

('REctat) qualifiedly of the characteristics in question (479A-B). As p
ously discussed, Plato introduces eponymy in the Phaedo explicitly to provide the semantics of the Form-participant relation, making clear there that

philosophers-as the only ones with knowledge of Forms-will also be the
sole individuals who understand that terms referring to them have a twofold

application and hence how to make it properly. Thus, Republic 5 not only
introduces a new dimension in Plato's discussion of appropriateness against
a literary backdrop, it may also take Plato's reaction to literary sources one
step further by underscoring an essential relation between his own two revised constructions of literary practice.

The foregoing inquiry emphasizes Plato's critical engagement with literary sources in three central areas as he develops his philosophy of language, alongside the theory of Forms, in the middle dialogues. As we have
seen, this recourse to literary precedents issues, in both the Phaedo and Republic, in revamped versions of notions prominent in literature. While Plato
finds it most fruitful to rely on philosophical sources in the articulation of
his theory of Forms, I hope to have shown that, when it comes to crucial
developments in his philosophy of language, it is to literary sources that he
turns. By bringing the latter debt to the fore, this article supplements earlier
accounts of the historical sources of Plato's theories. Above all, by exhi-

biting his threefold concern with literature in the development of his philosophy of language, it shows that Plato's occupation with it is far more
extensive and thoroughgoing than previously recognized.40
Smith College
40. I am grateful to the Editor and anonymous referees of CP for their helpful comments.
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